近年来，中国并购市场发展迅猛，伴之而来的是各种因为利益而产生的损害企业价值以及中小股东利益的行为。由于中国并购重组决策链条较长，并购重组的相关消息容易泄露，而且内幕信息扩散范围较广，例如政府官员、并购交易相关方人员等都有可能利用其信息优势地位来获取额外的经济利益，但其处罚依然相对较轻，从而导致并购交易是中国A股市场泄露内幕信息进行内幕交易的高发地带，这样的状况亟需改善。 本文以2001年至2011年在上海交易所和深圳交易所上市且发生了并购交易的A股上市公司为样本研究中国上市公司并购信息泄露情况并讨论其影响因素，并将并购交易双方按照是否上市进行分组研究，分别讨论其并购交易的信息泄露情况。首先运用事件研究法计算超额收益率指标并进行T检验，根据结果是否显著不为0判断中国并购市场是否存在信息泄露的情况；其次，通过描述性统计、单因素方差分析等方法对中国上市公司并购信息泄露情况进行实证分析；最后，在已有研究的基础上，根据并购交易的性质和特征以及交易双方的状况，对信息泄露程度的主要影响因素进行归纳整理，利用混合多元回归方法对其进行实证分析，并据以提出相应的政策建议。 研究表明：①中国上市公司并购交易中存在较为严重的信息泄露；②并购交易双方是否上市对并购信息泄露程度有显著影响，当交易双方中仅被并购方是上市公司而并购方非上市公司时，并购信息的泄露程度最高，而已有研究尚未探讨这样的分组影响；③2007年股权逐步实现全流通以来，控股股东或大股东获利途径增加，而市场监管尚未到位，导致上市公司并购信息泄露情况进一步恶化；④机构投资者持股比例与并购交易信息泄露程度显著正相关；⑤交易风险与并购交易信息泄露程度显著正相关；⑥信息披露水平与并购交易信息泄露程度显著负相关。因此，需加强对上市公司并购交易的市场监管，规范上市公司并购信息披露，提高并购市场的运行效率，保护广大投资者的切身利益。

In recent years, the rapid development of China's M&A brings damages to the corporate value as well as the interests of minority shareholders. Because of the chain of China’s M&A decision-making, M&A information is more likely to leak, and the spread of insider information is wider. For example, government officials, M & A stakeholders etc. are likely to take advantage of its information dominance to obtain additional economic benefits. But the punishment is not adequate, resulting in a high level of M&A information leakage for China's A-share, and such conditions need to be improved. This thesis takes all A-share companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2011 with M&A transactions as a sample to study of M&A information leakage among China’s listed companies and the influential factors to it, and groups the sample by whether the companies are listed to discuss the information leakage. First, run T-test for CAR computed by event study, and then judge according to the results whether M&A information leakage exists or not significantly. Second, conduct an empirical study on the situation of M&A information leakage among China’s listed companies by descriptive statistics and one - way ANOVA. Finally, sum up the main factors to the degree of information leakage according to the nature and characteristics of the M&A and the status of parties to the transaction on the basis of existing studies, using multiple regression to analyze them empirically, and to make appropriate policy suggestions. Study shows that: first, there exists serious M&A information leakage among China’s listed company; second, whether the companies are listed is related to M&A information leakage, the highest level of M&A information leakage appears only when the acquirees are listed companies, and it’s yet to explore; third, since the full circulation in 2007, the ways of obtaining benefits to controlling shareholders or major shareholders have increased, while market supervision is not yet in place, which leads to further deterioration; fourth, there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of institutional investors holding, trading risk and M&A information leakage; lastly, there is a significant negative correlation between quality of information disclosure and M&A information leakage. So we need to strengthen market supervision and information disclosure of M&A, to protect the interests of the majority of investors.