道德判断是指人们依据一定的判断标准，对自己或他人行为或特性的好坏进行评判的过程。道德判断的双加工理论认为道德判断是情绪和认知共同参与的结果，而个体做出判断时也会权衡行为的意图和行为的结果。目前，已有的研究主要关注不同的情绪类型或状态、不同的认知加工难度等对道德判断的影响，这些研究为我们提供了丰富的证据以验证双加工理论，然而，这些研究大部分忽略了个体判断标准的内在差异，实际上，当我们的道德标准不同时，对同一事件的看法也不一样，判断结果会受实际行为偏离我们预期行为的程度的影响，这种偏差就叫预测误差。以往一些研究已经关注到偏离预期奖励的误差 (即奖励预测误差) 对道德判断的影响，这个过程是一种认知加工计算，但是，鲜少有研究考察违背预期情绪 (即情绪预测误差)带来的影响，以及同时将奖励和情绪预测误差纳入考虑；另外，已有研究表明在道德判断时个体会同时考虑意图和结果，但未明晰对意图和结果的考量是如何影响道德判断的。基于以上几点，本研究以双加工理论为基础，设计两个实验分别探究两个问题： (1) 情绪预测误差能否同奖励预测误差一样影响道德判断？(2) 与意图和结果分别相关的情绪和奖励预测误差如何影响道德判断？

实验一：使用独裁者博弈范式 (Dictator Game)探究被试的情绪和奖励预测误差对道德判断的影响。结果表明，奖励和情绪效价预测误差越大，对搭档的道德评分越高，也就是说，当搭档实际的行为带来的奖励比自己预期的奖励越多、自己实际的感受比预期的感受越愉悦时，对搭档的道德评价就越高。

实验二：使用骰子游戏 (Trembling Hand Game)分离意图和结果，探究分别与意图和结果相关的情绪和奖励预测误差对道德判断的影响。结果表明，与意图相关的奖励和情绪效价预测误差都能影响道德判断，而与结果相关的只有情绪效价预测误差能影响道德判断；此外，与意图相关的奖励和情绪效价预测误差的影响力都比与结果相关的大。

综上，本研究通过两个实验探究情绪和奖励预测误差对道德判断的影响，并得到以下结论：(1) 情绪效价和奖励预测误差都能影响道德判断；(2) 在道德判断过程中，个体会权衡意图和结果，前者通过情绪效价和奖励预测误差影响道德判断，后者则通过情绪效价预测误差影响道德判断；并且，相比结果，个体在道德判断时更看重意图。这些结果既是对双加工理论的补充，也揭示了意图和结果对道德判断的影响机制；此外，情绪和奖励预测误差对道德判断的影响也帮助我们认识道德判断具有的个体差异性，既为我们理解自身和他人的道德感差异提供解释，也为提高人们社会适应提供指引。

Moral judgment refers to the process by which people judge their own or others' behavior or characteristics according to certain internal rules. The theory of moral judgment is that moral judgment is the result of emotion and cognitive participation, and the individual makes judgment and measures the results of the intent and behavior. Currently, these studies have provided us with rich evidence to verify the dual-process theory, however, these studies have largely ignored the internal differences of individual judgment standards, and in fact, when our moral standards are different, the opinions of the same event are different, and the results of the judgment are influenced by the extent of actual behavior that is deviated from our expected behavior, which is called the prediction error. Previous studies have focused on the impact of the expected rewards and the error of the expected reward, which is a cognitive processing, but few studies have seen the impact of the loss of expectations, as well as the consideration of rewards and emotion prediction errors. In addition, existing studies have shown that individuals consider intent and results in the context of moral judgment, but they do not clarify how the considerations and results of the intention affect moral judgments. As a result, this study is based on the theory of double - plus work, and two experiments are designed to explore two questions: (1) Can the error of the emotion prediction affect the moral judgment as the reward prediction error? (2) How does the emotion and reward prediction error of the intention and the result affect moral judgment?

In Experiment 1, the dictator game paradigm was used to explore the effect of participants' emotion and reward prediction errors on moral judgments. The results showed that the greater the reward and emotion valence prediction error, the higher the moral rating of the partner. In other words, when the partner's actual behavior brought more rewards than their expected reward, and their actual feelings were more pleasant than their expected feelings, the moral evaluation of the partner was better.

Experiment 2, using a dice game to separate intention and outcome, explored the effects of emotion and reward prediction errors related to intention and outcome, respectively, on moral judgments. The results show that both intention-related reward and emotion valence prediction errors can affect moral judgments, whereas only emotion valence prediction errors can affect moral judgments for outcomes, and in addition, both intention-related reward and emotion valence prediction errors are more influential than outcome prediction errors.

In summary, two experiments were conducted to explore the effects of emotion and reward prediction errors on moral judgment, and the following conclusions were drawn: (1) Both emotion valence and reward prediction errors can affect moral judgment; (2) In the process of moral judgment, individuals weigh intentions and consequences. The former affects their judgments through emotion valence and reward prediction errors, while the latter affects their moral judgments through emotion valence prediction errors. (3) In the process of weighing intention and consequence, individuals value intention more in moral judgment. These results not only complement the theory of double processing, but also reveal the mechanism of the effect of intention and outcome on moral judgment. In addition, the significant effects of emotion and reward prediction errors on moral judgments help us to recognize the individual differences in moral judgments, provide a theoretical basis for understanding ourselves and others, and provide guidance for improving social adjustment.